

**Page Denied**

N  
E  
S  
A

19201901 19201901 19201901  
ادارة التحليل لشؤون الشرق الاوسط وجنوب آسيا  
המחלקה לענייני המזרח התיכון ודרום אסיה  
اداره تجزيه و تحليل خاور ميانم و جنوب آسيا  
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis  
Directorate of Intelligence

9 April 1986

NOTE FOR: DCI

THROUGH : DDI

FROM : D/NESA/DI

Mr. Casey,

I find the attached both interesting and provocative. As you know, we have encouraged our better analysts to explore alternative analysis that goes against the grain of conventional wisdom. I believe [ ] effort is a fine example of this. The point is not to accept the alternative analysis, but to make sure you have thought it through.

25X1

25X1

ATT: A/S

SECRET NOFORN



C-305-IR

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/02 : CIA-RDP88G01116R001001510020-2

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 9 Apr 86	
TO: Executive Registry			
ROOM NO.		BUILDING	
REMARKS:			
FROM: DDI/NESA/PG			
ROOM NO. 7600		BUILDING HQS	
		EXTENSION	

25X1

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/02 : CIA-RDP88G01116R001001510020-2

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DDI- 01865x-86

9 April 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence Y  
Director, Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis

FROM:  25X1  
Research Branch, Persian Gulf Division, NESA

SUBJECT: An Iranian Victory in US Interests:  
An Alternative View

1. Most observers believe that an Iranian victory over Iraq would threaten US interests in the Middle East by emboldening Tehran to export its revolution to other Arab states. **A credible case can be made, however, that an Iranian victory would reduce the threat of additional Iranian military exploits, foster political moderation in Tehran and Baghdad, and enhance US security ties to Saudi Arabia and the smaller Persian Gulf states.** Under this alternative view, an Iranian victory would include the removal of Saddam Husayn, admission of Iraqi aggression, and reparations to Tehran from Baghdad and the Arab Gulf states--but not the institution of a puppet Shia regime in Iraq. (S NF)

2. The alternative view holds that the Iranians would claim military victory and agree to end the war through negotiations short of their publicly stated goal of toppling the Ba'thist government in Baghdad. Iran will not hold out for the complete military subjugation and occupation of Iraq because it is logistically beyond its capabilities, and it would risk a significant broadening of the conflict.

- Tehran realizes that it would risk a major military confrontation with other Arab states if it neared its objective of instituting a Shia regime in Baghdad.
- Syria would abandon Iran well before Baghdad's fall because Damascus would view Iranian military advances into Iraq as threatening its own security interests.
- Iran would risk a Soviet commitment of combat troops to Iraq to preserve Moscow's interests. (S NF)

3. Still, the minimum Iranian requirements for a negotiated settlement almost certainly would include:

- the removal of Saddam Hussein;

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

25X1

C-30F-IR

SECRET NOFORN

- a public Iraqi admission that it was the aggressor in the war;
- an agreement by Iraq and the Arab Gulf states to give Tehran war reparations, probably no less than \$20 billion over a period of several years. (S NF)

**Alternative View Analysis**

4. Although most observers believe that an Iranian victory over Iraq would strengthen the radicals in Tehran, the alternative view argues that a victorious Iran is likely to become politically moderate sooner than a defeated or stalemated Iran. This view holds that the formidable forces of political moderation and Westernization in Iran that have been cowed by war-propelled Islamic radicalism would be revitalized in a post-war Iran.

- Victory over Iraq would serve as an **essential cathartic release** for the pervasive frustration and hostility that have developed from the downfall of the Shah, the US hostage experience, and the increasing international isolation of Iran. Absent this, the Iranians are likely to remain radical, antagonistic, and extremely anti-US.
- Tehran has diverted popular attention toward external enemies to maintain the momentum of the Islamic revolution. **An end to the war--even on Iranian terms--would focus attention on the country's extensive social and economic problems, increasing antiregime sentiment and activities.**
- Moderate and Western-educated technocrats would have a greater say in the rebuilding of Iran after the war because developmental strategies and planning would be emphasized and ideological pursuits would become less important. Consequently, **the influence of the radical clerics would wane.**
- Desperation in the war has forced Iran to turn to North Korea, Libya, and other radical states for support. These ties will continue under a stalemate; an Iranian victory ending the conflict would open doors to more moderate states. (S NF)

5. **A victory for Tehran would stop Iranian war-making efforts.** Iran has neither the will nor the capability to occupy Iraq militarily or to take on other countries in the region. Rhetoric notwithstanding, Tehran and the Iranian population want an end to the death and destruction caused by the war. The Iranians are likely to settle for less than the establishment of a like-minded regime in Baghdad because the achievement of several important tactical objectives would allow the Iranian leadership to opt for a popularly acceptable way out of the conflict.

- Sharply reduced oil revenues and dim prospects for improvements in the oil market have made the continuation of the present war more costly. **Another war would be unthinkable from an economic and military perspective.**

SECRET NOFORN

- The defeat of Iraq would significantly **weaken Islamic fanaticism among the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij** because their rallying call to wreak vengeance on Iraq in general--Saddam Husayn in particular--would be removed. Moreover, there is little popular support for undertaking another military conflict. (S NF)

6. Iranian meddling in Lebanon has been fueled by the Iran-Iraq military stalemate and the resultant perpetuation of radical strength in Tehran. **The growing influence of moderates after an Iranian victory would erode support for continued Iranian involvement in Lebanon.**

- A victorious Iran probably would engage in some initial subversive ventures in the Gulf states, but the eventual moderation of the Iranian leadership would undercut these policies. (S NF)

7. Iranian military pressure is promoting political moderation in Baghdad and has led to improved ties between Iraq and Arab moderates including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. An Iranian victory would accelerate these trends by making Iraq even more dependent on these moderate states for political and financial support.

- The removal of the autocratic and ruthless Saddam Husayn--a prerequisite for ending the war--is unlikely to contribute initially to political instability or an upheaval of the Iraqi political system. The Ba'thist regime in Baghdad is firmly entrenched, and **Taha Ramadan--Husayn's likely successor--probably would maintain the present course of Iraqi moderation.**
- Baghdad's eagerness to subvert neighboring Arab states--a hallmark of Iraqi foreign policy before the war--will be sharply reduced if Iraq loses. (S NF)


8. **An Iranian victory would foster closer military and security ties between the United States and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.** Regardless of whether or not Tehran presented a conventional military threat, these states would perceive themselves at great risk. Saudi Arabia, in particular, would look to an increased US presence in the region as the principal deterrent to further Iranian military moves.

- To protect itself against possible Iranian retaliation for its support of Iraq in the war, **Riyadh almost certainly would grant the United States, at least temporarily, limited access to military facilities, allow the prepositioning of some US military equipment on its territory and engage in more extensive contingency planning with US military forces.** The Saudis would hope these moves would be sufficient to deter Iranian aggression.
- The other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council would follow the Saudi lead on improving ties to the United States. (S NF)

9. **An Iranian victory would enhance US interests and damage Soviet influence in the Middle East.**

SECRET NOFORN

- The failure of the Soviet-trained, advised, and equipped Iraqi forces almost certainly would **lead Baghdad to turn toward the West for new security and military relationships**, although it also would continue to rely on Moscow to help maintain its largely Soviet equipped military.
- Iran's deep-rooted anti-Communism and suspicions about Soviet intentions in southwest Asia preclude a meaningful Iranian shift toward Moscow. **After the war, Tehran is likely to look to Western Europe and Third World states, not the Soviets, for an arms supply relationship.**
- **Tehran probably would devote more resources in support of the Afghan insurgents after defeating Iraq.** (S NF)



25X1

SECRET NOFORN

SUBJECT: An Iranian Victory in US Interests: An Alternative View

Distribution:

- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - ER
- 1 - DDI
- 1 - DDI Registry
- 1 - VC/NIC (Ford)
- 1 - VC/NIC (Fuller)
- 1 - NIO/NESA
- 1 - D/NESA
- 1 - C/NESA/PG
- 1 - C/NESA/PG/R
- 1 - PG/R

DDI/NESA/PG/R  (8Apr86)

25X1

SECRET NOFORN